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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
MARK ANTHONY CRUSE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
NO. 40033 
Bannock Co. Case No. 
CR-2011-14768 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Has Cruse failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by 
imposing concurrent unified sentences of seven years, with three years fixed, upon his 
guilty pleas to principal to delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to 
deliver, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence? 
Cruse Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
On August 22, 2011, Cruse and his associate sold approximately 26.3 grams of 
cocaine to a confidential informant for $950.00. (PSI, p.3.) Two days later, officers 
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executed a search warrant on Cruse's residence and found 25.8 grams of cocaine 
inside his toilet tank and a digital scale and drug ledger in the bedroom. (PSI, p.3.) 
The state charged Cruse with principal to delivery of cocaine and possession of 
cocaine with intent to deliver. (R., pp.52-53.) The matter was subsequently 
consolidated with a case charging Cruse with trafficking in cocaine. (R., pp.77-78; PSI, 
p.6.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Cruse pied guilty to principal to delivery of cocaine 
and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and the state dismissed the trafficking 
charge and agreed to recommend unified sentences of seven years, with three years 
fixed. (R., pp.87-90; 3/19/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-19.) The district court imposed concurrent 
unified sentences of seven years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.95-98.) Cruse filed a 
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp .105-07.) He also filed a 
timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., 
pp.101-02, 116-17.) 
Cruse asserts that the district court abused its discretion by declining to place 
him in the retained jurisdiction program, in light of his claim that "the social science 
literature on deterrence demonstrates that sentencing [Cruse] to a seven year prison 
term and not allowing him to participate in the rider program even though he appears to 
be amenable to rehabilitation will not create any additional general deterrent effect than 
would allowing a rider." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) Cruse has failed to establish an 
abuse of sentencing discretion. 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
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(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. kb 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kb 
The decision whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion 
of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The primary purpose of a district court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to 
obtain additional information regarding whether the defendant has sufficient 
rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation. State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677, 
115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005). Probation is the ultimate goal of retained 
jurisdiction. kb There can be no abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient 
evidence before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for 
probation. kb 
On appeal, Cruse claims that the district court's only "reason for not allowing 
[him] to participate in the rider program was because the court believed that a longer 
sentence was necessary to serve as a deterrent to others who would otherwise commit 
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drug offenses." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Cruse's entire argument focuses on the merits 
of deterrence as a sentencing objective, and he supports his claims with randomly 
selected "social science" articles that are not contained in the record. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.5-6.) Even though deterrence, both general and specific, is a statutorily authorized 
sentencing consideration (Idaho Code § 19-2521 (d) and (e)) and has long been 
recognized as one of the four primary goals of sentencing (State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 
565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982)), Cruse quibbles with this legal authority by citing to 
two articles that indicate legal punishment is ineffective or has a "negligible" effect as a 
deterrent. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6). Immediately thereafter, Cruse contradicts himself 
by citing a third article that indicates legal punishment does indeed have a deterrent 
effect, but "the perceived severity of the punishment does not." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
Cruse altogether ignores the goals of community protection and retribution and instead 
relies on the three "social science" articles to support his claim that prison is not 
necessary as a deterrent for any person who "appears to be" amenable to rehabilitation. 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) Contrary to Cruse's argument, it is not appropriate for a court to 
discount the primary objective of sentencing - protection of society - or to rely solely on 
excerpts from "social science literature" as a basis for its sentencing decision rather 
than considering the governing sentencing criteria. 
In this case, the district court articulated its consideration of all four of the 
sentencing objectives and appropriately determined that a prison sentence was 
necessary to meet the goals of protection of society, retribution, and deterrence. (See 
5/7/12 Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.34, L.25.) The instant crimes are not Cruse's first offenses. 
Although was only 24 years old when he committed the instant felony offenses, Cruse 
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had already accumulated at least 11 misdemeanor convictions and incurred several 
probation violations. (PSI, pp.4-7.) The presentence investigator determined that 
Cruse presents a high risk of reoffending and recommended imprisonment. (PSI, 
pp.13-14.) At sentencing, the court stated: 
. . . I can't be lenient with drug dealers. And that's why the legislature has 
made the penalty for these two crimes, two penalties that you've pied 
guilty to, a penalty up to life. That's how serious it is in this state. And it is 
serious. 
So when I impose a three plus four on you for dealing, I am even in 
that sense being somewhat lenient. So when I take into account that I 
have to deter other dealers, I have to punish you for what this is. This is a 
terrible [sic] that you did. You're not a terrible person. You did a terrible 
thing, and I have to do some kind of protection of our community from 
drug dealers. I want everybody to get that message. 
(5/7/12 Tr., p.34, Ls.11-25.) 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed 
appropriate sentences, reasonably determining that Cruse was not a viable candidate 
for the retained jurisdiction program or probation. The sentences imposed are 
appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offenses and the damage such offenses do 
the community, Cruse's continuing decisions to engage in criminal behavior, and his 
high risk to reoffend. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Cruse has failed to 
establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
Cruse next asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion. If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the 
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 
838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Cruse must "show that the sentence is 
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excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion." kl Cruse has failed to satisfy his burden. 
Cruse provided no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.101-
04.) At the Rule 35 hearing, he merely reiterated his remorse and his desire to be 
placed in the retained jurisdiction program. (6/25/12 Tr., p.38, L.9 - p.41, L.6.) On 
appeal, Cruse argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion "[f]or the same reason" that it abused its discretion by declining to retain 
jurisdiction at the time of sentencing. In denying Cruse's Rule 35 request for leniency, 
the district court again informed Cruse that sentence reductions were not appropriate in 
light of the seriousness of his crimes and the need to protect society. (6/25/12 Tr., p.41, 
L.7 - p.42, L.25.) The state submits that by failing to establish his sentences were 
excessive as imposed, Cruse has also failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. 
Conclusion 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Cruse's convictions and 
sentences and the district court's order denying Cruse's Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2013. 
LORI A. FLEM! 
Deputy Attorney 
VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
Paralegal 
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